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I.     Introduction 
 It is often argued that high wage or labor costs in Western Europe are the 
driving force behind the increasing business practice of international outsourcing 
across industries (see e.g. Stefanova (2006) and Amiti and Wei (2005)). One reason 
for the wage gap between Western European and Eastern European or Asian 
countries is the difference in labor market institutions. Typically in Western Europe, 
wages for low-skilled workers are set by the government via minimum wage 
arrangements or determined by bilateral bargaining between firms or employer 
federations and labor unions. On the contrary, unions in Eastern European or Asian 
countries are much weaker or wages are determined by market forces. Therefore, 
flexible outsourcing, which is decided after knowing the domestic production costs, 
is a significant threat for employment in the low-skilled segment in industrialized 
countries. To work against this threat and make domestic production more 
attractive, lower wages or higher productivity are needed. While the first call due to 
the described labor market structure in Western Europe is difficult to realize, the 
second postulation might be realized by introducing a profit sharing scheme, which 
is often expressed by labor unions or politics. Due to this scheme from the worker 
point of view, the relationship of income and wage will be released, while from the 
firm’s perspective costs and wages are decoupled. Thus, it is possible to decrease 
the wage but to generate the same income.  
 Although profit sharing is an important phenomenon in OECD countries1, 
the productivity effect is ambiguous.2 On the one hand it is argued that due to profit 
sharing motivation and identification with the firm is stimulated and thus effort 
respectively productivity increases. On the other hand, there could be free riding 
behaviour, since if there are n  employees and profits will be equally distributed, an 
individual receives only n/1  of the extra profit, which will lead to fewer incentives 
to increase effort.   
 However, profit sharing also affects the wage bargaining. Concerning the 
wage effect of profit sharing, several studies confirm that higher profit sharing 
decreases the bargained wage3, since higher wages decrease the profit of a firm and 
                                               
1       Pendleton et al. (2001) have presented detailed data on profit sharing schemes in 14 OECD 
countries. For further evidence regarding the incidence of profit sharing, see also Estrin et al. 
(1997) and Conyon and Freeman (2004). 
2  For an increasing effect on productivity, see Cable and Fitzroy (1980), while, Jensen and 
Meckling (1979), and Kruse (1993) demonstrate negative productivity effects of profit 
sharing. 
3  See e.g. Weitzman (1987), Wadhwani (1988), Fung (1989) and Holmlund (1990). However, 
there are also empirical studies, such as Wadhwani and Wall (1990) and Kraft and Ugarkovic 
(2005), which show that profit sharing does not reduce the wage. 
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thus the profit income of the worker. Due to this loss, the union’s marginal costs of 
an increasing wage are higher and therefore, higher profit sharing will induce a less 
aggressive wage setting. 
 Bringing together the finding concerning the relationship between domestic 
wage and outsourcing plus the possible wage decreasing effect of profit sharing, 
one would expect that profit sharing lowers the outsourcing demand. However, as it 
is shown in Koskela and König (2010), profit sharing decreases the bargained wage 
and thus outsourcing. But if the labor union also sets the effort or productivity level, 
the firm will desist from implementing a profit sharing scheme.    
 In contrast to Koskela and König (2010), in this paper we combine profit 
sharing  and  outsourcing,  when the  wage  rate  is  set  by  a  labor  union,  but  effort  is  
decided individual by the worker. In this context, we analyze the impacts of profit 
sharing on a firm’s incentive to outsource domestic production by answering the 
following questions: First, how does the implementation of profit sharing affect 
effort and thus productivity? Second, how does profit sharing influence the wage 
and thus outsourcing demand? Third, will the firm implement a profit sharing 
scheme, if workers decide individually about effort provision?    
 We find that profit sharing and the wage level have an individual effort-
augmenting effect and therefore increase productivity. This results from the fact 
that higher profit sharing increases the income, which sets an incentive to increase 
the profit due to higher effort. Concerning our second question, we demonstrate that 
the  wage  effect  of  profit  sharing  is  ambiguous.  On the  one  hand,  there  is  a  wage  
decreasing substitution effect, but on the other hand, there is a wage increasing 
effect via labor demand elasticity. Therefore, the outsourcing or employment effect 
is also ambiguous. Regarding our third question, we find that under certain 
circumstances there will be a profit sharing scheme, which characterizes due to the 
modeling  of  effort  determination  the  central  difference  between the  results  of  this  
paper and those of Koskela and König (2010). 
 We proceed as follows. Section II presents the time sequences of decisions. 
Also, the labor and outsourcing demand and employee effort are presented. Section 
III investigates the wage formation by a monopoly labor union and the optimal 
profit share. Finally, we present our conclusions in section IV. 
 
II.  The Model 
 We assume that the output depends not only on domestic labor and 
international  outsourcing,  but  also  on  the  effort  by  workers,  i.e.  the  workers’  
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productivity. This lies in conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis.4 We 
analyze a timing decision, which captures the idea that the representative firm is 
flexible to decide about outsourcing simultaneously with domestic labor demand, 
but commits to profit sharing before wage determination. After the firm has decided 
about profit sharing, the monopoly labor union sets the wage given the profit share 
level. Knowing the base wage the representative firm determines outsourcing and 
employment. Once the wage and profit share level are known, the representative 
worker decides on effort provision. We summarize these timing decisions in Figure 
1. The decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward induction. 
 
Figure 1:  sequences of decisions  
    
   stage 1  stage 2        stage 3              
   profit         wage        outsourcing M , labor demand L  
   sharing ?                 formation w          and effort determination ie   
 
 As we mentioned, output depends on effort, domestic labor and outsourcing. 
We combine these inputs in a concave production function which is characterize as 
 
? ? ? ? 1
11
,
???
???
?
???
? ??
?
??
?
?
?
?
MLeMLeF ,  with 10 ???                            (1) 
 
where the price of the output is normalized to unity, L  is  the amount of domestic 
labor and M  the firm’s input acquired from external suppliers through outsourcing.  
The average effort of the firm’s worker is described by e , where the average effort 
is defined as ?
?
?
L
i
ieL
e
1
1 , so that the impact of provision of an additional unit of 
effort by a single worker is 
Le
e
i
1??
? .5 The parameter ?  indicates the elasticity of 
substitution between effective labor and outsourcing. Following the reasonable 
assumption that there is a substitutability between them, we focus on ??? ?1 . For 
indicating decreasing returns to scale, we further assume 10 ?? ? . 
                                               
4      See e.g. the book edited by Akerlof and Yellen (1986), which includes the main initial 
efficiency wage papers about (i) shirking models, (ii) labor turnover models, (iii) adverse 
selection models and (iv) sociological models. 
5  A specification, which is also common in the literature, describes effort as the fraction of 
working hours that the worker actually works. Since the number of working hours is 
normalized to 1, the choice of an individual is ? ?1;0?ie  and thus ? ?ie?1  characterizes the 
fraction of time spent shirking. Following this, Le  is the whole actual working time. 
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II.1.   Outsourcing and Domestic Labor Demand 
The firm decides on domestic labor and outsourcing to maximize the profit 
function  
 
? ? ? ? ? ?McLwF
ML
????????? ??? 11max
;
,                                      (2) 
 
by taking the average effort, e , wage, w ,  and profit sharing, ? , as given. For the 
costs of outsourcing c  we  assume  that  they  include  other  costs  as  transport  and  
communication costs or costs for monitoring and quality control. However, to be 
simple, we sum these kinds of costs and assume that the unit costs of outsourcing 
are constant.  
 Solving the first-order conditions of (2), we can yield the conditional labor 
and outsourcing demand 
  
? ?? ? ??????? 11111/ FewcewL ????? ????? ,                                        (3a) 
? ?? ? ?????? 1111/ FccewM ???? ????  .                                               (3b) 
  
In the case of substitutability, we have to secure that 0?LMF  respectively 0?MLF . 
For guaranteeing this, we have to assume ?? ?? 1
1  for our analysis. One can show 
from the conditional demand functions that domestic labor demand is a negative 
function of wage and a positive function of both outsourcing costs and effort, while 
the external procurement is a positive function of domestic wage rate and a negative 
function of outsourcing costs and effort. However, equation (3a) shows also that the 
conditional labor demand does not directly depend on profit sharing, which also lies 
in conformity with empirics.6 
 At  this  stage,  we  can  look  at  the  direct  labor  demand elasticities.  Defining  
the direct own wage elasticity of the labor as 
L
w
w
L
w ?
????  and  the  direct  effort  
elasticity of the labor as 
L
e
e
L
e ?
??? , we obtain 
  
? ? ??? ???? 11
ssw ,                                                                      (4a) 
01??? we ?? ,                                                                               (4b) 
                                               
6         See e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997). 
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where ? ?? ? ??
?
??
?
?
?
11
1
/
/
cew
ews  characterizes the cost share of domestic labor (see 
Appendix A for the detailed mathematical derivation). 
 
II.2.   Individual Employee Effort  
          By  following  the  efficiency  wage  literature,  we  assume  for  the  employed  
worker that the utility function is additively separable, where the utility depends 
positively  on  the  income  and  negatively  on  the  disutility  of  effort.  The  employed  
worker receives an income y , which includes both the wage w  and  the  profit  
income 
L
??  so that the overall remuneration is 
L
wy ???? . The idea behind this is 
that the workers are a team, where the whole team gets the profit share ?? ? , which 
is distributed equally to the member. However, to get the profit income, requires 
effort provision by a single worker. Since the worker dislikes effort provision, it is 
associated with a disutility, which can be described by the convex function ? ?eg , 
where ? ? ?? /1eeg ??  with 10 ?? ?  so  that  ? ? ? ? 0' 1/1 ?? ??eeg  and 
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? 01/1'' 2/1 ??? ??? eeg .  
Since  the  profit  is  equally  distributed  among  the  members,  every  
(homogenous) worker gets the same per capita profit income, but he/she realizes the 
individual disutility for providing a certain effort level. Thus, there is room for free-
rider behavior by the single worker, which means that there is an incentive for 
shirking. The biggest problem of the firm’s owner is to solve this moral hazard 
problem and to verify the individual effort. However, in the discussion of the free-
rider problem, the interactions of group members as well as peer pressure are often 
neglected. Due to the implementation of profit sharing, there are incentives in the 
group to internalize the externalities of free-riding and avoid shirking, since it sets 
an incentive to observe each other and interact.7 This may build up a peer pressure 
to provide the effort resulting from individual utility maximization and eliminate 
the moral hazard problem concerning the free-rider behavior. Following Kandel and 
Lazear (1992), we motivate this peer pressure as a social group norm. Due to the 
observation, the individual feels ashamed or guilty, if the individual effort is below 
this norm, since it lowers the income for each of the team members. However, an 
effort above the norm also decreases the individual utility, since now the other team 
members feel ashamed. Thus, any deviation from the norm leads to a utility loss. 
                                               
7  See Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Varian (1990). Radner (1986) 
shows, that in repeated games the free-rider problem can be eliminated even if the players 
cannot observe other players’ actions or information, but can observe the consequences. 
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Therefore, the peer pressure function can be written as ? ? ? ?2~ ii eeeP ?? , where e~  is 
the social norm and defined as the average effort of all workers other than i .8    
From this framework, we can write the utility of a single employed individual 
in (5a) and of an unemployed individual in (5b)  
 
? ?2/1 ~ ii eeeLwv ?????
???? ,                                                        (5a) 
bv ? .                            (5b) 
 
The worker’s problem is to choose the level of individual effort to maximize its 
utility. For simplicity, suppose that observation of team member is costless and that 
the group norm is not affected by the individual effort, i.e. 0
~
??
?
ie
e .9 Thus, the 
individually provided effort level results from individual utility maximization of 
(5a) with respect to effort, which yields the first-order condition10 
 
? ? ? ?eee
eLe
v ????
???
? ? ~21/1 ??? .                                                         (6) 
 
Using our production function and ?
?
?
H
i
ieL
e
1
1 , which leads to 
Le
e
i
1??
? , we obtain 
for the individual effect on profit ewe // ???? .11 Due to our assumption of Nash-
behaviour, where every worker takes the effort of the others as given, the individual 
chooses an effort level equal to the group norm. However, every group member 
faces the same calculus, which means that the group norm corresponds to the 
average effort level. Therefore, the individual effort equals the average effort level 
and thus the effort level which would be chosen without any peer pressure, i.e. we 
have eee ?? ~ . Using this, we get from solving equation (6) the effort function   
 
?? ?
?
??
?
? ???
L
wee .                                                                  (7) 
                                               
8  We assume that every group member can verify the effort of the others, but the firm owner 
cannot do this. In our specification, the punishment of shirking or overly motivated members 
is an individual utility loss and not an income loss, and can be interpreted as mental 
harassment or social exclusion.  
9  In our framework, we assume Nash behavior, where every worker chooses his/her effort 
taking the effort of others as given. So there is no effect of effort provision by the other 
workers and thus no effect on the social norm. See also Lin et al. (2002). 
10  The index i  has been dropped for notational convenience. 
11  For a detailed derivation see Appendix B. 
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From  equation  (7),  we  see  that  the  optimal  effort  by  the  representative  worker  is  
influenced by the income parts, but outsourcing will have no direct effect.  
Since changes in wage and profit income affect all workers, every single 
worker will adjust his/her effort and thus the average effort will change. We derive 
these effects by taking the differential of effort function (7), which yields 
? ?
? ? 011
1 ????
??
w
e
dw
ed
w
w
?
??  and ? ? 011 ????? ??
?
?
e
d
ed
w
, so that the wage and profit 
sharing enhance productivity by increasing effort provision and positively affect 
labor demand indirectly, which lies in conformity with empirics.12  
For the following analysis, the wage elasticity of effort becomes important. In 
our framework we find, 
 
? ?
? ? 111
1
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
???
????
w
w
e
w
dw
ed
?
???   as  
2
1
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
? ,                                   (8) 
 
so that the elasticity of effort in terms of wage is only one, if we have the specific 
parameter 2/1??  for the disutility of effort.13 According to (8), the effort elasticity 
increases  (decreases)  if  the  disutility  of  effort  becomes  less  (more)  convex.  Since  
we are interested in the effect of profit sharing if the wage is determined by a labor 
union, we have to assume that 2/1?? . The reason for this assumption is that only 
in this case, the wage setting by the labor union would be binding for the firm.  
For the effort elasticity concerning profit sharing we found that it is positive, 
but smaller than one, i.e.  ? ? ? ?1;011 ?????? wed
ed
?
??
?? . 
We can now summarize our findings as. 
 
Proposition 1: Profit sharing and the base wage have an individual 
effort-augmenting effect and thus increase productivity, whereas the 
wage elasticity of effort depends on the parameter of disutility of effort 
so that it can be smaller, equal to or higher than one.   
 
                                               
12       See e.g. Booth and Frank (1999), Cable and Wilson (1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), 
Kruse (1992), Lynn Hannan (2005) and Wadhwani and Wall (1990).  
13      In a dynamic efficiency wage model without outsourcing, Jellal and Zenou (2000) have 
obtained the same result in terms of effort wage elasticity.   
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For the above mentioned reason, in the following analysis, we concentrate on the 
case in which the wage elasticity of effort is smaller than one, i.e. 1?? .     
 
III.  Wage Formation by Monopoly Labor Union and Committed 
Profit Sharing 
Now we analyze stage 2, when the representative firm commits to profit 
sharing before the wage formation.  
 
III.1. Wage Formation under Committed Profit Sharing  
         We first analyze the wage formation by the monopoly union (see also Cahuc 
and Zylberberg (2004), p. 401-403) by taking profit sharing as given and by 
assuming that the union is utilitarian. Therefore, the objective function of the 
monopoly labor union is assumed to be ? ? vLNvLV ??? . By using the equations 
(5a) and (5b) the unions’ calculus is to maximize the surplus anticipating domestic 
labor demand (3a), outsourcing demand (3b) and effort function (7) according to 
 
? ?? ? bNLbegwV
w
????? ??max ,                                               (9) 
  
where b  is the exogenous minimum income for the labor union members N .    
         Solving problem (9), we get as the first-order condition  
 
? ?? ? ? ? 01 ???
?
??
? ?
?
??
?
? ??????
dw
edgw
L
w
dw
degbw
L
w
dw
dL
w
LVw
?? ,         (10)  
 
where the overall wage effect on the profit, includes the direct wage effect and the 
indirect effect via effort, so that ? ? 01 ????? L
dw
d ??  when 1?? . Using this and 
? ?
w
e
dw
edg ?? ??
/1
 as well as the total wage elasticity of labor  ? ?? ?11
1
???
????
w
w
?
????  (see 
Appendix A), the first-order condition (10) can be solved to   
   
? ?
? ????
??? ?
???
???
11
/1ebw .                                                                    (11)      
 
From equation (11) one can see that profit sharing affects the wage in different 
ways.  The  first  working  channel  is  the  direct  effect,  which  can  be  seen  in  the  
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denominator  of  (11),  while  the  second  is  an  indirect  effect  via  the  total  wage  
elasticity ?  and via effort e , respectively via the wage elasticity of effort ? . 
Starting with the direct effect ? ??? ?? 1 ,  we see that this one can be distinguished 
into  two  working  mechnism.  The  first  part  of  the  term  ??? ?  describes the pure 
substitution effect. Since a higher wage will decrease profit and therefore profit 
income, it increases the resulting utility loss of a wage increase for the union 
respectively its members. Due to this increasing effect on the union’s marginal 
costs, higher profit sharing will induce a less aggressive wage setting. Therefore, 
this effect will decrease the base wage, which means that a former part of the base 
wage is substituted by profit income. However, the wage decrease also affects the 
effort.  Thus,  the  second part  of  the  term describes  a  feedback  effect  via  the  wage  
elasticity  of  effort.  Due  to  our  assumption  1??  we see, that the direct effect 
dominates and profit sharing will lead to wage moderation. 
The indirect working channel of profit sharing is characterized by the effect 
on the labor demand elasticity ? , effort e  and wage elasticity of effort ? . We 
know that higher profit sharing increases effort and thus productivity. Intuitively, 
the higher productivity will be compensated by a higher wage level, which can also 
be seen from equation (11). Another indirect impact results from the effect on the 
wage elasticity of the labor demand. As pointed out in Appendix A, higher profit 
sharing makes the labor demand less elastic, i.e. 0??
?
d
d . Since profit sharing 
increases effort and induces a higher labor demand, the utility loss of the union 
concerning a higher wage decreases, which lead to a more aggressive union and a 
higher wage level. While the effort and labor demand elasticity effects raise the 
wage, the effect via the wage elasticity of effort is ambiguous. Using equation (8) 
we find that 0??
?
d
d .  As  one  can  see  from (11),  higher  profit  sharing  will  have  a  
wage increasing effect (numerator) but also a wage decreasing effect (denominator) 
via the wage elasticity of effort.  
This verbal description shows that profit sharing via the direct effect has a 
wage moderation impact while it affects the wage via the indirect effect in an 
ambiguous way. Even, if we assume that the impacts of profit sharing via the 
indirect effect are working in the same directions and increase the wage, the direct 
and indirect working channel are opposed effects. Thus, a priori we cannot identify 
the overall impact of profit sharing on base wage. 
Due  to  the  difficulty  to  derive  the  wage  effect  of  profit  sharing  from  an  
intuitively point of view, we now turn to a detailed mathematical analysis. Using 
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our former results concerning effort and wage elasticity of effort respectively labor 
demand, we can rewrite equation (11) as  
 
? ?
? ?
? ? .,,
21211
1
2 bwcAb
LL
w
w
w ??
?
?
??
?
? ???????
?
???
? ???
???? ?
??????
???       (11a) 
   
It should be emphasized that (11a) is an implicit formulation, as both the numerator 
and denominator in the mark-up factor ? ??,,wcA  depend on wage w  in a non-linear 
way via labor demand and direct wage elasticity of labor demand.  
The implicit differentiation of (11a) with respect to profit sharing gives  
bA
bA
d
dw
w?
?
1
?
?  and by substituting Awb /? , we can characterize this as   
 
A
wA
A
wA
d
dw
w?
?
1
?
? ,                                                                                (12) 
 
where 01 ??
A
wAw  under the assumption 1111 ???
?
??
? ?
?
??
?
? ??
L
??   (see Appendix B).  
In  terms  of  profit  sharing  in  Appendix  B,  we  point  out  that  there  are  two  
effects which influence the term 
A
wA? . While the first impact is positive under the 
assumption that 1111 ???
?
??
? ?
?
??
?
? ??
L
?? , the second impact will be negative if the profit 
share elasticity of labor demand is smaller than one, i.e. 1?
Ld
dL ?
? .  Therefore, under 
these  assumptions,  the  effect  of  profit  sharing  on  the  wage  is  a  priori  ambiguous,  
which means that ??
A
wA?  if 1?? .  
We can summarize our findings as follows.14 
        
                                               
14      One can also show in this model that lower cost of outsourcing decreases wage under the 
assumption that 1111 ???
?
??
? ?
?
??
?
? ??
L
?? .  Lower  outsourcing  cost  means  for  given  wage  level  a  
higher outsourcing demand and a more elastic labor demand. Thus the opportunity for the 
labor union to set higher wages falls. This lies in conformity with empirics concerning 
evidence from various countries, e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Hijzen et al. (2005), Hsieh 
and Woo (2005), Egger and Egger (2006), Geishecker and Görg (2008) and Munch and 
Skaksen (2009). 
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Proposition 2:  In the presence of flexible outsourcing when the wage 
elasticity of effort and the profit share elasticity of labor demand are 
smaller than one, profit sharing has an ambiguous effect on the base 
wage and therefore a compensatory or supplementary character.  
 
However, we can also analyze the impact of profit sharing on wage for the special 
case 2/1?? , where the wage elasticity of effort is one, i.e. 1?? .  In this case,  as 
shown in Appendix B, the effect of profit sharing can be expressed as 
 
01
2
1
11
????
?
???
?
??
?? ??
?
??? Ld
dLw
d
dw ,                                                     (13) 
 
 where ? ?1;0
1
1
1
??
??
? w
w
Ld
dL
?
??
? ?
.  
 We can summarize this finding as 
 
Corollary 1: When the base wage elasticity of effort is one, profit 
sharing has a negative effect on the base wage and therefore a 
compensatory character. 
 
Our analysis shows that profit sharing has in general a supplementary or 
complementary character, while in the special case 1?? , we found that profit 
sharing lowers the bargained wage and thus it is a compensatory income part.15  
Using  the  wage  effects,  we  can  demonstrate  the  effects  of  profit  sharing  on  
outsourcing and employment in the general case 1??  and the special case 1?? .  
We can write the working channel of profit sharing on outsourcing as 
??? d
dw
dw
dM
d
ed
e
M
d
dM ????
??  where 0??d
ed , 0??
?
e
M  and 0??
???
??
dw
ed
e
M
w
M
dw
dM . 
Using  the  former  results,  we  have  in  the  general  case  (for  a  detailed  analysis  see  
Apendix B)   
 
? ?
?
?
?????
??
??
??? d
dw
dw
dM
d
ed
e
M
d
dM
??
                                                       (14) 
                                               
15  There is also some empirical evidence for both properties. Black and Lynch (2000) show by 
using U.S. data, that profit sharing results in lower regular pay for workers, what implies a 
compensatory character, but in Wadhwani and Wall (1990) by using UK data and also in 
Kraft and Ugarkovic (2005) by using German panel data it has been shown that introducing 
profit sharing do not reduce the wage, what implies a supplementary character. 
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For the special case 1??  we get for the impact of profit sharing on outsourcing an 
unambiguous result, since now the wage effect can be determined. Thus we have in 
that case  
 
?
0
11
?????
??
?
?
??
? ????? ?? ??? d
dw
dw
dM
d
ed
e
M
d
dM .                                            (15) 
 
In a similar way, one can also analyze the effect of committed profit sharing on 
employment. The employment impact can be formalized as 
??? d
dw
dw
dL
d
ed
e
L
d
dL ????
?? , where 0??d
ed  and 0??
???
??
dw
ed
e
L
w
L
dw
dL . Thus, we have 
in the general case 
 
? ?
?
?
?????
??
??
??? d
dw
dw
dL
d
ed
e
L
d
dL
??
                                                            (16) 
 
For the special case, when the wage elasticity of effort is one, we have  
 
?
0
11
?????
??
?
?
??
? ????? ?? ??? d
dw
dw
dL
d
ed
e
L
d
dL .                                                 (17) 
 
We can now summarize these findings as  
 
Proposition 3: The effect of profit sharing on flexible outsourcing and 
domestic employment is  
(a) ambiguous, when the wage elasticity of effort and the profit share 
elasticity of labor demand are smaller than one, but  
(b) unambiguous negative on outsourcing and positive on employment, 
when the wage elasticity of effort is one. 
 
Implementing profit sharing will affect the wage and therefore domestic labor 
demand and outsourcing. Since the wage effect of profit sharing is in the general 
case ambiguous, also the wage induced demand reactions are ambiguous. However, 
there is also a productivity effect due to effort. Since profit sharing increases effort, 
this leads to an increasing labor demand and some outsourcing activities will be 
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avoided. For our special case, we could show that due to the compensatory 
character of profit sharing, the wage effect and productivity effect are working in 
the same directions and lead to a higher domestic labor demand and lower 
outsourcing. Notice that this can also happen in the general case even if profit 
sharing leads to a higher wage. In that case, the wage effect will be dominated by 
the productivity effect.   
 
III.2. Optimal Committed Profit Sharing  
 On  this  stage,  we  close  the  model  and  concentrate  on  the  optimal  profit  
share. At this point, we have to refer to Koskela and König (2010) to make clear the 
central difference to this paper. While in Koskela and König (2010) there is a 
central effort determination by the labor union, here we model an individual effort 
determination. Resulting from this modeling, we find that in the case of individual 
effort determination the wage increases worker’s productivity, while in the case of a 
central effort setting the productivity is unaffected by profit sharing. For the optimal 
profit share, Koskela and König (2010) show, that although profit sharing lowers 
the base wage, a profit maximizing firm will abstain from such a compensation 
scheme.  Therefore, the question we elaborate is, if the firm will implement a profit 
sharing scheme, when the base wage effect is complemented by an increase effort 
respectively labor productivity? 
The problem of the firm is (see Appendix C for the detailed calculation) 
 
? ? ? ? ? ?cMwLF ???????? ????
?
11max * ,                                  (18)   
                              
subject to the domestic labor and outsourcing demand, effort and base wage.  
From (18) we get the first-order condition ? ? 01
*
* ???? ?
???
d
d ,  where  the  profit  
effect of profit sharing can be calculated as ? ? ??
?
??
? ??????
wd
dwLw
d
d ?
?????
? 1
*
. Using 
?
?? ?? 1
*
s
w
L
, the optimal committed profit share is implicit given by 
 
? ?
???
?
?
????
?
??
? ????? ?
??
????
?
swd
dw 111 ,                                                 (19) 
 
where ?  is the effort elasticity in terms of profit sharing, ?  is the wage elasticity of 
effort and s  is the cost share of domestic labor. Since we assume that domestic 
 14
labor and outsourcing are not perfect substitutes, we have 10 ?? s , which means 
that the RHS of (19) is definitively positive.  
To  answer  our  research  question  and  show  if  the  firm  will  implement  a  profit  
sharing  scheme  or  not,  we  have  to  analyze  the  sign  of  the  LHS,  respectively  the  
term in brackets. 
From the former analysis we know that 0??  and 10 ?? ? . Therefore the sign and 
the size of the profit share elasticity of the base wage determine the sign of the term 
in brackets. For a detailed analysis, we can distinguish two cases i) profit sharing 
decreases the wage and ii) profit sharing increases the wage. 
 
i) profit sharing decreases the wage 
This case implies that profit sharing has a compensatory character, since the 
reduced wage income will be compensated by profit income. Formally, this means 
that the profit share elasticity of the base wage is negative, i.e. 0?
wd
dw ?
? . Since 
profit sharing decreases the wage and increases the productivity at the same time, 
the firm owner gains if such a scheme will be implemented. One can see this in 
equation (19), where the term in brackets is positive for 0?
wd
dw ?
? . Therefore, to 
fulfill equation (19) the term ?
??1  has to be positive, which is only true for 0?? .  
 
ii) profit sharing increases the wage 
In contrast to the argumentation above, since profit sharing increases the base wage, 
i.e. 0?
wd
dw ?
? , only the effort increasing effect favored the implementation of a 
profit sharing scheme from the firm perspective. However, if the productivity effect 
dominates the wage effect, the loss of higher wage costs will be compensated by 
higher productivity. Therefore, it is still beneficial for the firm to implement a profit 
sharing scheme. Algebraically this is also shown in (19), where a dominating 
productivity effect is characterized by ? ?
wd
dw ?
??? ??? 1 , which means that the term 
in brackets is positive. To fulfill the first order condition also ?
??1  has  to  be  
positive, which gives 0?? . 
If the productivity effect doesn’t overweight the wage effect, i.e. ? ?
wd
dw ?
??? ??? 1 , 
the firm owner desists from profit sharing, since the costs of an implementation of 
such a scheme are higher than the gains by increasing the productivity. Concerning 
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equation (19) this results because under ? ?
wd
dw ?
??? ??? 1  the term in brackets 
becomes negative. Since the RHS of (19) is positive the condition is only fulfill for 
01 ???
? . As one can see, this holds for 0?? . Since implementing a negative profit 
share is impossible, we obtain a corner solution, where the firm desists from profit 
sharing. In that case the firm owner remains the overall profit. Of course, 01 ???
?  
also holds for 1?? , which means that the workforce receive the overall profit, 
while  the  firm  owner  has  no  income.  However,  under  the  assumption  of  0* ?? , 
this  is  no  option  for  the  firm owner,  since  in  the  case  of  0??  he can realize this 
profit.  
  
Proposition 4: For individual effort provision, the firm will optimally 
implement a profit sharing scheme, 
(a) if profit sharing has a compensatory character and 
(b) if profit sharing has a supplementary character, but the productivity 
effect exceed the wage effect. 
 
Similar to the analyze above, we also determine the optimal profit share for the 
special  case  of  1?? . Since we know that 0
1
?
??
?
? wd
dw , the firm will implement 
such a compensation scheme. In that case, from equation (19) we yield for the 
optimal profit share 
 
   ? ? ? ?1;01 1
1
1
?????
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ???
??
?
s
s
. 
 
 Corollary 2: When the base wage elasticity of effort is one, the firm will 
 implement a profit sharing scheme. 
 
The analysis above shows that under an individual effort determination the firm will 
induce higher productivity with the implementation of profit sharing, while in 
Koskela and König (2010) the effort is constant.  
However, profit sharing can affect the wage, which also has an impact on the 
decision to implement a profit sharing scheme. In Koskela and König (2010) it is 
shown that although profit sharing lowers the base wage, a profit maximizing firm 
will abstain from profit sharing, since the wage reduction realized by the union is 
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lower than the needed wage reduction by the firm. As our analysis shows under a 
positive effort effect of profit sharing in case of wage moderation the firm will 
implement such a compensation scheme. Further it was shown that also in the case 
of a supplementary character this kind of compensation scheme will be 
implemented if the induced productivity effect dominates the wage increasing 
effect.  Thus,  the  difference  of  effort  determination  respectively  existence  of  a  
productivity effect  is  crucial  for the decision to implement a remuneration scheme 
with profit sharing. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
In the public debate, outsourcing is associated with less employment, since it 
is cheaper. To work against this threat, the domestic wages has to decline. However, 
this results in an income loss. To solve this puzzle, an alternative compensation 
scheme with profit sharing can be implemented, since it can positive affect the 
productivity and decrease wage without lowering the income of the workers. If 
labor markets are imperfect since a union set the wage, we have analyzed the 
questions: First, how does the implementation of profit sharing affect effort and 
thus productivity? Second, how does profit sharing influence the bargained wage 
and thus outsourcing demand? Third, will the firm implement a profit sharing 
scheme, if workers decide individually about effort provision?    
  We have found the intuitive result that profit sharing and the wage level have 
an individual effort-augmenting effect and therefore increase productivity. This is 
due to the fact that higher profit sharing sets an incentive to increase the working 
effort to realize more profit and therefore to increase the income. Concerning our 
second question, we demonstrate that the wage effect of profit sharing in general is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a wage decreasing substitution effect, but on 
the other hand, there is a wage increasing effect via labor demand elasticity and 
effort. Therefore, the outsourcing and employment effect is also ambiguous. Since 
the labor demand effect consist of a productivity effect and a wage effect, domestic 
employment can increase even if profit sharing leads to a higher wage. If the wage 
will decline, the employment effect will be definitively positive. Regarding our 
third question, we find that there will be a firm’s optimal committed profit sharing 
under individual effort determination, if profit sharing has a compensatory 
character, i.e. the wage declines. Also, if profit sharing has a supplementary 
character, i.e. the wage increases, there can be such a compensation scheme. 
However, in that case the productivity effect has to dominate the wage effect. This 
result shows that the effort determination and therefore the productivity effect is 
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decisive to implement an alternative compensation scheme with profit sharing, 
where the income is uncoupled from the wage. 
 
Appendix A: total and direct own wage elasticities  
The first-order conditions of equation (2) can be expressed as 
???
?
?
?
?
1111 ???? ????? LFeFw L  and ???
?
?
111 ??? ???? MFFc M . For the cross 
derivatives we obtain ?
?
??
?
? ???????? ?
???
??
?? ???
?
?
? 11
111
MLM FLFeF  and 
?
?
??
?
? ???????? ?
???
??
?? ???
?
?
? 11
111
LML FMFeF , where 0?LF  and 0?MF . Since 
under the assumption of substitutionality of the inputs 0?LMF  and 0?MLF  has to 
hold, we have to assume that 011 ??? ??
? , which lead to ?? ?? 1
1 . 
Using (3a) and (3b) we can solve for the cost function by substituting the 
conditional demand system (3a) and (3b) in cMwLK ?? .  As the cost function we 
obtain 
? ?? ? ?????? 11111/ FkFcewK ????? ???  .                                          (A1) 
Thus the cost share of labour and outsourcing can be expressed as 
? ?
? ? ??
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
? 11
1
1 /
/
cew
ew
Fk
wLs , ? ? ??
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?? 11
1
1 /
1
cew
c
Fk
cMs .   (A2) 
For the wage impact on labour demand, we use (3a). The derivative of concerning 
the wage, L
w
L ??
? , can be formulated as 
? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? .//
//1
1
111
1
1
1
1
111
1
1111
11
?
?
?
?????
?
?
?
???
??
?
???
??
?
?
?????
?
????
????
?
?
?
??
?
????????
?
??
?
????
????
e
wcewFew
e
wcew
w
F
ewcew
w
FFL ww
Substituting (3a) and (A2), this expression can be simplified to 
L
w
sL
w
F
Y
LL ww ?????
??
?
1 .                                                        (A3) 
Rewritten the profit function to KF ???  the first order condition for a profit 
maximum ?
?
?
?
?
1
1 Fk  can be solved to ?
?
?
?
? ???? 11 kF , which gives 
F
w
sFw ?
?
??? 1 . Inserting this in (A3) we get 
? ? 01
1
??
?
??
?
? ????? s
s
w
LLw ?? .                                                    (A4) 
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In a similar way, we obtain  
?????
?
eLe
L ,                                                                               (A4a) 
0
1
1 ???
?
??
?
???????
?
??Mw
sM
w
M
w ,                                          (A4b) 
0
1
1 ???
?
??
?
????????
?
??Me
sM
e
M
e .                                         (A4c) 
Analogously, we have 0?cL  and 0?cM . 
From (A4) one can determine the labour demand elasticity 
? ? ? ? ????? ?????????
???
1
11
1
ssss
L
wLw
w .                      (A5) 
The effect of the wage rate on the direct own wage elasticity taking into account the 
impact on effort can be expressed as 
0
1
1 ??
?
??
?
? ?????
? ??
?
w
w s
w
,                                                            (A6) 
where ? ?? ?? ? 0111 ????? ?? s
w
ssw  since we assume 1??  and ?? ?? 1
1 . 
The effect of profit sharing on the direct own wage elasticity taking into account the 
impact on effort can be expressed as 
0
1
1 ??
?
??
?
? ?????
? ???
?
?sw ,                                                            (A7) 
where ? ?? ? 011 ????? ??? d
eds
e
ss . 
Since, the base wage w  affects total labor demand in two ways, we can separate the 
total elasticity into a direct labor demand effect and an indirect effect via effort: 
??
???
? ??
???
?????
dw
ed
e
w
L
e
e
L
L
w
w
L
L
w
dw
dL? , where wL
w
w
L ???
?? , 1???
?
wL
e
e
L ?  and 
??
e
w
dw
ed , so that we can rewrite the total wage elasticity as  
? ? ? ?
w
w
wL
w
dw
dL
???
?????? ??
????????
1
11 .                                   (A8) 
The total wage elasticity can be presented in terms of direct wage elasticity as   
? ? 01
21
2 ???
???
?
ww ???
?
?
?  as 
2
1?? ,                                               (A9) 
so that there is a positive relationship between the total wage elasticity and the  
direct own wage elasticity in the case 2/1?? . 
Therefore, in terms of total wage elasticity of labor demand, when the wage 
elasticity of effort is smaller than one, 1?? , a higher wage increases the total wage 
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elasticity of labor demand ,0??
???
??
wdw
d w
w
?
?
??  while higher profit sharing 
decreases it 0??
???
??
?
?
?
?
?d
?d w
w
. 
Writing the profit as ?FkF?
1
??? , with ? ?? ? 111/ ??? ?? ???? cewk , one obtain as the 
optimal output ?
?
?
?
? ?
?
? ?? 11 kF .  Using  this,  the  direct  profit  effect  of  individual  
effort 
e
e
e
FFkF
e
k
e
F
e
e
e
FkF
e ?
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
??????
???
???
???
???
?
???
? ???
??
? ??
?
?
?
? 11
1
 can be solved 
to   
e
eF
e
k
e ?
????
????
? ??
1
. In combination with the conditional labor demand (3a), 
and 
Le
e 1??
?  this gives 
e
w
e
??
?? . The direct wage effect ? ?
w
KF
w ?
????
?? , where 
?
1
FkK ??  characterize the total costs. Thus, we have 
w
K
w
F
F
K
w
F
w ?
???
???
???
???
?? , 
where the first order condition of profit maximization is 0??
???
???
?
w
F
w
K
w
F . Finally 
we have under using Hotelling’s lemma, i.e. L
w
K ??
? , which yield L
w
???
?? . 
Taking into account the effort reaction, the overall wage effect on profit is 
dw
ed
ewdw
d
?
???
?? ??? , which gives ? ? L
dw
ed
e
wLL
dw
d ???????? ?? 1 . 
 
Appendix B: wage effect of profit sharing  
We find that the wage is a mark-up on the outside option. The mark-up 
? ?? ? XA w /1 ?? ??? , where ? ? ??
??
?
? ??????
?
???
? ????
LL
X w
?????? 21211
2
, is a 
implicit formulation, where the effect of wage on the mark-up can be expressed as  
? ? ? ?? ? ??
?
??
?
?
?????
??? ?
w
X
w
XXA www ??
?? 112  so that 
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?w
w
w
w
X
w
X
w
Xw
A
wA
??
?????
??
??
?
??
?
?
??????
??
?
1
11
                              (B1) 
where 0??
? w
w
w?  as seen from equation (A6).  The wage effect on the X -term is 
? ? ?
?
??
?
????
?
??
?
?????
?
???
?
???
? ????
?
L
w
dw
dL
LL
w
dw
dL
L
w
wL
w
w
X
w
w ????????
22
121 , which can be 
rewritten as  
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Using (B2) and ? ?? ?wXY ??? ???? 1 , we can express (B1) as  
   ? ? ? ?? ?? ? 01111121 21 ????
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? ????
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since 0??
?
w
w?  if 1??  and 1111 ???
?
??
? ?
?
??
?
? ??
L
?? . In this case, we have 01 ??
A
wAw . 
Finally, the effect of profit sharing on the mark-up can be expressed by using 
? ? ? ?? ? ??
?
??
?
?
??????
??? ? ?????
???
XXXA ww 11
2  so that we have   
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?w
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?????
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                                (B4) 
where 0??
?
?
?w  as  seen  in  (A7).  The  effect  of  profit  sharing  on  the  X -term is 
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
LLd
dL
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X
ww
w ?????
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????? 11211121
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??????????
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?
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? , where 
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?? , which can be solved to  
? ? 01 ????????
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Using this, (B4) can be written as 
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? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ??
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where the first term is positive under the assumptions 1111 ???
?
??
? ?
?
??
?
? ??
L
??  and 
2/1??  since 0??
?
?
?w . If the elasticity of labor demand in terms of profit sharing 
is 1?
Ld
dL ?
? , the second term is negative. Consequently under these assumptions, 
the effect of profit sharing on the mark-up and on the wage is a priori ambiguous, 
i.e. ??
A
wA?  and ???d
dw .  
For the special case 2/1??  respectively 1??  equation (B3) can be simplified to 
? ?? ?? ?
? ? 111
1 ?????
????? ?
???
w
ww
A
wA , while (B6) becomes ???
?
???
?
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?
1
1?
? ?
?? Ld
dLw
A
wA  with 
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. Using these expressions the wage effect of profit sharing 
is 01
2
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11
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?? ??
?
??? Ld
dLw
d
dw , which corresponds to equation (13). 
The effect on the outsourcing demand is ??? d
dw
dw
dM
d
ed
e
M
d
dM ??
?? , where 
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?? . Using (A4b) and (A4c) the effect on outsourcing can be 
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The effect on the outsourcing demand is ??? d
dw
dw
dL
d
ed
e
L
d
dL ??
?? , which can be 
rewritten to  
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Appendix C: Effect of profit sharing on indirect profit 
Differentiating the indirect profit *?  in terms of ?  gives  ?
?
?
?
?
?
d
ed
ed
dw
dw
d
d
d
?
???
***
. 
Using the results of Appendix A, we can rewrite the profit effect to 
? ? ??
?
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? ???? ????
?
d
dw
d
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d
d 1
*
.                                                       (C1) 
The first order condition ? ? 01
*
* ???? ?
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d
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1
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? ? ? ?
1*
11
?
??
?
??
? ????? ???
??
d
dw
d
ed
e
w
L
.                                                (C2) 
With the conditional labor demand ?
1
F
w
skL ??? , where ? ?? ? 111/ ??? ?? ???? cewk  
and ?
?
?
?
? ?
?
? ?? 11 kF  the per capita profit becomes  ?
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. Inserting this in 
(C2), we get  
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which equals equation (19) with 
ed
ed ?
?? ? .  
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